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Summary 
An element of the NASA/FAA windshear program is the integration of ground-based microburst 
information on the flight deck, to support airborne windshear alerting and microburst avoidance. NASA 
conducted a windshear flight test program in the summer of 1991 during which airborne processing of 
Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) data was used to derive microburst alerts. Microburst 
information was extracted from TDWR, transmitted to a NASA Boeing 737 in flight via data link, and 
processed to estimate the windshear hazard level (F-factor) that would be experienced by the aircraft in 
each microburst. The microburst location and F-factor were used to derive a situation display and alerts. 
The situation display was successfully used to maneuver the aircraft for microburst penetrations, during 
which atmospheric "truth" measurements were made. A total of 19 penetrations were made of TDWR-
reported microburst locations. Predicted and measured F-factors agreed well in penetrations near 
microburst cores. Although improvements in airborne and ground processing of the TDWR measurements 
would be required to support an airborne executive-level alerting protocol, the practicality of airborne 
utilization of TDWR data link data has been demonstrated. 
Introduction 
NASA and the FAA have been cooperating in a joint program since 1986 to reduce the hazard of low 
altitude windshear to transport category aircraft. The NASA efforts have concentrated on the airborne 
aspects of the problem, including the areas of microburst hazard characterization to aircraft, advanced 
sensor technology, and flight deck procedures and displays. The FAA has implemented ground-based 
solutions to the problem including training (ref. 1) and the Low-Level Windshear Alerting System 
(LLWAS) and the Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) program. 
In 1990 a memorandum of agreement between NASA and the FAA was signed, with a major element being 
the integration of ground-based windshear information on the flight deck. One purpose of the integration is 
to improve the timeliness of this time-critical information by providing a data link directly from the TDWR 
to the aircraft. Presently TDWR information is relayed verbally to aircraft by air traffic control after the 
aircraft has been handed off from the approach controller to the local controller. At this late stage of the 
approach the pilot may not receive the information until microburst contact is unavoidable (ref. 2). A 
second purpose of the integration is to derive microburst hazard information from the TDWR that is 
compatible with airborne in situ (reactive) and forward-look detection and alerting systems. Presently the 
TDWR system identifies the microburst phenomena by locating regions of divergence (ref. 3). The 
magnitude of the wind change across a microburst is measured and reported to flight crews as a wind loss 
to be expected and the approximate location of the threat (i.e. "expect a 50 knot loss three mile final".) 
Since the scale length of the wind change is not directly considered in the information sent to the crew, and 
the degree of hazard to an aircraft depends upon the windshear (ratio of wind change to scale length of that 
change, ref. 4 & 5), messages received from the ground system may conflict with data derived from 
onboard systems. 
Ground rules were established for the integration program. These specify that 1) neither the ground 
systems nor current ATC/pilot roles be changed, 2) operational procedures are kept simple, 3) the 
air/ground roles are task tailored such that the ground system locates and classifies windshear events and 
the airborne system quantifies and annunciates the threat, and 4) the effort will focus on existing 
technology integration and evaluation. The TDWR system was to remain unchanged because years of 
testing have demonstrated its microburst detection capability, the system design was essentially frozen for 
production, and even minor changes would be prohibitively expensive. In concept, the current TDWR or 
integrated TDWR/LLWAS systems will remain in place and information existing within those systems will 
be extracted for data link to aircraft. That information will then be processed onboard along with relevant 
aircraft data (position, speed, altitude) to derive a situational display and hazard index for use with airborne 
alerting systems.
This air/ground integration concept was implemented for testing during a series of combined sensor 
windshear flight tests conducted by NASA during the summer of 1991 (ref. 6). These tests involved 
intentional microburst penetrations by the NASA Langley Boeing 737-100 equipped with experimental 
forward-look doppler radar and infrared windshear detection systems. A NASA Langley developed in situ 
algorithm (ref. 7) provided validation measurements during the microburst encounters. These flight tests 
were flown at two locations served by TDWR or equivalent. The first site was Orlando, Florida, which 
was served by the MIT Lincoln Laboratory operated TDWR testbed radar. The second site was Denver, 
Colorado, which was served by the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) operated Mile-
High radar. This radar was functionally equivalent to the TDWR testbed and utilized the same microburst 
detection algorithms as the Orlando site during our flight tests. The combined sensor flight tests provided 
an ideal opportunity for evaluation of the air/ground information integration concept. 
Nomenclature 
Abbreviations: 
AGL Above ground level 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
GSD Geographic Situation Display 
LLWAS Low Level Windshear Alerting System 
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
NCAR National Center for Atmospheric Research 
TDWR Terminal Doppler Weather Radar 
TSO Technical Standard Order 
UTC Universal Coordinated Time
Symbols: 
D	 Aircraft aerodynamic drag. 
F	 Windshear hazard index, F-factor. 
g	 Gravitational acceleration, 9.28 rn/s/s. 
h	 Altitude above ground. 
hr	 Altitude above ground of TDWR radar beam. 
H	 Altitude above ground of peak microburst outflow speed. 
L	 Characteristic shear length for F-factor estimation. 
T	 Aircraft thrust. 
V	 Aircraft true airspeed. 
Vg	 Aircraft speed over the ground. 
W	 Aircraft weight. 
Wx	 Component of inertial wind along aircraft flight track. 
Wh	 Vertical (updraft) component of inertial wind. 
f3	 Estimation of maximum one-kilometer wind gradient along path through microburst. 
Inertial flight path angle. 
YP	 Potential inertial flight path angle. 
R	 Distance over which the TDWR-measured wind change occurs, reported by TDWR. 
AU	 TDWR-measured wind speed change through microburst. 
System Concept 
The baseline TDWR system (ref. 8) consists of a radar, a ground processor to identify regions of 
divergence and classify them as microbursts, a geographic situation display to depict microbursi locations 
relative to runways and approach paths to the ATC tower supervisor, and an alphanumeric ribbon display 
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for presenting windshear and microburst information to the local controller for voice transmission to pilots 
(shown by non-shaded blocks in figure 1). A typical voice message from the local controller to an aircraft 
is "Microburst alert, threshold wind 140 at 5, expect a 50 knot loss two mile final.' The concept under test 
required that certain data be extracted from the TDWR, automatically transmitted to an aircraft over a data 
link, and processed by airborne algorithms to compute the windshear hazard and provide annunciation and 
display. Only ground to air data link is required to provide airborne alerting. A down link may be used to 
provide the ATC system with information that a windshear alert has been generated by the airborne system. 
No changes to the existing TDWR system are required to support this concept although additional modules, 
depicted by the shaded blocks in figure 1, are required to transmit TDWR data to the aircraft. 
The current TDWR operational concept is to detect microbursts by examining radar-observed wind 
velocity information for regions of divergence. When the radar detects a wind speed change of greater 
than 15 meters per second (29 knots), along multiple adjacent azimuth scans, over a distance of at least 
1 kilometer (0.54 nm), a shape algorithm draws a microburst icon around the divergence region. 
"Windshear" icons are drawn around wind speed change regions of at least 7.5 meters per second. The 
microburst is then quantified for ATC and pilots by the wind speed change value. The actual hazard to the 
aircraft depends heavily, though, on the scale length of the wind speed change, i.e., the change of wind per 
unit distance, or shear (ref. 4 and 5). Existing airborne windshear systems as well as those under 
development derive an F-factor hazard index (ref. 4) that is based on wind change per unit distance and 
downdraft. 
To provide airborne executive level alerting from TDWR information, an estimate must be made of the 
windshear in the microburst and the downdraft component. The information required for this estimate are 
readily available from the TDWR system. Since (at a readily available level) the TDWR produces a single 
velocity and distance number for each microburst, insufficient data are available to estimate the shear 
along arbitrary paths through the event. Since the microburst flow field is being characterized by a global 
measurement of AU and AR, the F-factor estimate becomes a "worse-case" prediction of what would be 
encountered while penetrating the event. The core F-factor estimate is then combined on the aircraft with 
TDWR microburst icon shape and location information to determine if an alert should be given. An 
executive level alert requires immediate corrective or compensatory action by the crew. Such a warning 
requires a very low nuisance alarm rate, on the order of I nuisance per 250 hours of system operation. A 
nuisance is defined as an alert received when system alert threshold conditions exist but do not produce a 
hazard to the aircraft. The test for validity of an executive level alert is that a threat predicted at a given 
time is actually experienced by the aircraft at a later time, if the pilot were to ignore the alert and continue 
straight ahead. 
In this implementation a track-up moving map situational display depicted the microburst icons, as derived 
by the TDWR, the F-factor for each icon as computed onboard the aircraft, and the alerts generated from 
the TDWR data. The term TDWR F-factor will be used frequently in this report. This refers to the product 
computed on the aircraft using TDWR-supplied data. The TDWR system itself does not produce an 
F-factor estimate. Note that the alerts generated onboard the aircraft, using TDWR data, are not the same 
as the TDWR-generated alerts communicated by ATC to the aircraft. The TDWR-generated alerts are 
based solely on ground observations, while the airborne TDWR alerts are generated by aircraft systems 
using both ground-based information and aircraft specific data. 
Windshear Hazard Estimation from Ground Products 
The windshear hazard index used by airborne in situ detection systems and by airborne forward-look 
systems under development is the "F-factor" (ref. 4). The F-factor is not a description of the microburst 
itself, as are parameters such as wind change, reflectivity, and temperature, but is a measure of airplane 
performance degradation within a wind field. The F-factor scales directly with aircraft excess thrust to 
weight ratio so that the potential (constant airspeed) flight path angle in a windshear can be approximated
by: 
p T—D —F
	 (1) 
where T, D, and W are thrust, drag, and weight respectively. Since performance, rather than stability and 
control, effects are being described by the F-factor, a suitable scale length for integration of the F-factor 
must be chosen. Studies have shown that an appropriate scale length to be on the order of 1 kilometer (ref. 
4&5). 
From reference 4 the F-factor can be written 
F=!!_L 
g V 
where W. is the rate of change of horizontal, along-track, wind experienced by an aircraft, Wh is updraft 
speed and V is aircraft airspeed. Since ground-based and airborne doppler systems cannot measure Wor 
Wh directly, these parameters must be inferred from spatial wind gradients measured along the scanning 
beam. From reference 4, the horizontal F-factor can be determined from the spatial shear measurement by 
ax 8	 (3) 
and the updraft can be estimated from mass continuity constraints by: 
WI, =_2h Y.L	 (4) 
ax 
This leads to an F-factor estimate that can be produced from spatial measurements of windshear:
 2h] 
F =	 + 
ax[g V 
The windshear within a microburst can be estimated from the wind change and scale length information 
provided by the TDWR and an assumed wind profile. The TDWR information describes the endpoints of 
the peak-to-peak winds and the assumed wind profile is used to derive information about the wind field 
between the peaks. The horizontal wind profile of the analytical Oseguera/Bowles microburst model 
described in reference 9 was used to estimate the least-squares shear value over a distance L about the core 
of the microburst. Since aircraft performance degradation from windshear requires shear lengths on the 
order of 1 kilometer, or greater, a value of one kilometer for L was used in the experiment. 
The TDWR microburst function is oriented towards identifying regions of divergence and characterizing 
those regions with a quantitative measure of wind speed change. The TDWR does this by identifying 
"segments" along each azimuth scan that contain a threshold wind speed change and then identifying 
groups of adjacent segments (ref. 3)(figure 2). Each segment is one degree apart in radar azimuth. When 
these groups are identified, a shape algorithm produces a racetrack or circular icon that encloses the 
segments yet minimizes the area of the icon. The icon is then characterized by the wind change within it. 
Site adaptable parameters allow tuning of the icons to isolate strong and weak wind changes in large areas 
of divergence and to choose how the wind change is reported (maximum segment wind change or a 
percentile).
(2) 
(5) 
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For F-factor estimation from the icon data an additional parameter is required. This parameter is the 
distance over which the wind change is occurring and will be called AR. Each divergence segment has its 
own wind speed change and length. In this experiment the AU and AR sent to the aircraft was determined 
as follows. If five or fewer segments define an icon then the maximum AU value was sent. If this test 
fails, then if 20 or fewer segments define an icon send the second largest AU value. If more than 20 
segments define an icon then send the 90th percentile segment AU value. In practice, nearly all icons 
consisted of less than 20 segments and either the largest or next largest wind speed change value was 
normally sent. The AR value was determined by examining the shear value of each segment in the icon 
and choosing the 85th percentile shear value. A AR value was then determined that would produce this 
85th percentile shear when divided into the transmitted AU value. As an example, one icon penetrated in 
the 1991 flight tests (event 143) was defined by 4 segments having AU values of 17.1, 18.9, 22.6, and 20.2 
meters/second and AR values of 3140, 3460, 4500, and 4210 meters, respectively. The corresponding 
shear values were 5.45, 5.46, 5.02, and 4.80 meters/second/kilometer. Since four segments defined the 
icon the largest AU value (22.6) was transmitted. The 85th percentile shear value was the second largest 
(5.45) which produced a transmitted AR value of 4150 meters (rounded to the nearest 10 meters). The 
shape tuning at Denver was slightly different but not described here due to the lack of microburst 
penetrations at that site. 
Given the AU and AR of each icon, and the altitude of the radar measurement, a shear and downdraft 
estimate can be made. The resulting F-factor estimator, as originally derived by Bowles (ref. 4) is: 
F = KL[() (AR)3 45  eif (CXL)][3 + 2/zr] 
	
—	 (6) 
AR L	 L 2o	 &? g V 
where K = 4.1925, a = 1.1212, hr = the above-ground-level (AGL) altitude of the TDWR radar beam in the 
microburst, and L = the characteristic shear length of 1000 meters. It is this algorithm that was 
implemented onboard the NASA aircraft for real-time TDWR icon F-factor calculation. 
Test Setup 
Data Link System and TDWR Interface 
To support the system concept described above it was necessary to implement a data link capability and 
transmit the required information. The information required to estimate the F-factor of each shape was AU 
and AR (to estimate shear) and the AOL altitude of the radar beam in the microburst (to estimate the 
downdraft contribution). Microburst icons are either circular or racetrack in shape and are described by 
two points and a diameter about those points (figure 2). This information was provided on the data link by 
transmitting the diameter and the XIY coordinates of the two points with respect to the TDWR site. When 
combined on the airplane with the latitude and longitude of the TDWR site, this data enabled aircraft-
relative display of the icons. Note that the diameter of a microburst shape is not necessarily the same as 
the AR of the wind change due to the various possible orientations of the racetrack icon relative to the 
divergence segments. In addition to AU, AR, beam altitude, and shape coordinates and diameter, the time 
of the TDWR measurement was transmitted for later correlation with airplane measured microburst data. 
The necessary information was transmitted over the data link in the form of ASCII characters, with fixed 
field positions and character lengths for each parameter. Each microburst icon message was shipped in 
packet format, with up to eight icons described by each packet. A packet consisted of header information 
describing the number of icons and packets in the message, time of TDWR measurement, and a packet 
checksum. This header required a total of 14 ASCII characters. Each microburst icon required 25 ASCII 
characters. If a given message described 10 microburst icons, then two packets were required for a total of 
278 ASCII characters (10 * 25 + 2 * 14). Values of microburst location were transmitted with a resolution 
of 100 meters, values of microburst diameter and icon size were sent with a 10 meter resolution, and wind
change was sent with a resolution of 0.1 meter per second. The radar beam altitude resolution was 10 
meters. 
Since the TDWR system only provides updates at approximately one-minute intervals, a low, 1200 baud 
rate connection provided adequate capability. A dedicated telephone line provided a connection between 
the TDWR and a NASA-operated data link ground station. The ground station consisted of a modem, 
desktop computer for monitoring the data link operation, and an MFJ Enterprises, Inc. MFJ-1270B INC 
packet radio (figure 3). In addition to the end-to-end data integrity provided by the checksums, the TNC 
packet system also provided automatic repeat transmissions in the event a temporary radio disconnect 
prevented message reception. Software on the aircraft also compared the TDWR measurement time on the 
data link to the previous messages received, and the TDWR cockpit display continuously indicated the age 
of the displayed data. Warning messages were also provided on the TDWR display if the data link radio 
connection was lost. This data integrity checking was required since the TDWR information, in addition to 
its use in a research mode, was also being used in flight for real-time decisions regarding choice of 
microbursts to penetrate and monitoring flight safety criteria before penetration. To enhance the 
operational use of the TDWR data link, a waypoint type message was also implemented. This feature 
allowed a TDWR operator, with access to raw displays of radar reflectivity and doppler winds, to select a 
precise location for aircraft penetration and telemeter those coordinates to the aircraft for display. This not 
only assisted in finding the strongest region of a microburst icon, but also enabled the ground operators to 
direct the aircraft to other phenomena, such as gust fronts and developing microbursts, that did not generate 
icons on the data link. A waypoint type message required 16 ASCII characters and the position resolution 
was 100 meters. 
Test Airplane and Research Flight Deck 
The test aircraft was the NASA Langley Transport Systems Research Vehicle (TSRV) Boeing 737-100. 
this aircraft is equipped with two cockpits, a standard cockpit and a research flight deck. The research 
flight deck, located in the forward cabin of the aircraft, provided augmented fly-by-wire control laws and 
multiple electronic displays that were used for situational awareness, flight safety criteria monitoring, test 
progress monitoring, and flight control during setup for microburst encounters. Research flight deck 
displays provided precise navigation for microburst encounters near busy terminal airports. 
Cockpit Situational Display and Alerting Criteria 
The TDWR icon information was presented on a research flight deck moving map display, along with 
supporting flight state parameters, and recorded on video tape for later analysis. The supporting data 
(figure 4) included the TDWR data age (elapsed time since last data link reception) and in situ F-factor in 
the upper right corner; true airspeed, time, radar altitude and inertial wind vector in the upper left corner; 
ground speed and barometric altitude below the ownship symbol; and magnetic track angle above the track 
scale. Microburst alerts generated by the onboard TDWR algorithms were displayed by the message 
"TDWR ALERT" in red letters just below the track scale. The wind change and F-factor of each icon were 
shown numerically by labels that stepped from one icon to the next at the rate of about one icon per second 
(to reduce display clutter) and by color coding the icons. White was used to draw icons with F less than 
0.105, amber for icons between 0.105 and 0.15 F, and red for icons with F-factors at or above 0.15. Also 
shown on the display were the limits of TDWR coverage and the waypoint which could be transmitted by 
the TDWR operator. This display is not intended to represent a format that should be implemented for 
fleet operational use. The display was designed for data analysis and for situational awareness and 
operational use during research flights. 
The sketch shown by figure 4 was drawn from a video tape of the approach to event 143 on June 20, 1991. 
Four microbursi icons are ahead of the airplane and a waypoint transmitted by the TDWR operator is on 
the flight path at a range of about 2.8 km (1.5 nautical miles). The aircraft has a ground speed of 122 m/s 
(237 knots) and the radar altimeter value is 323 in (1061 feet). A TDWR alert has been generated by 
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onboard logic and is displayed. The dotted line just beyond the nearest icon represents a 30 kilometer 
range ring from the TDWR site, which is behind the aircraft. 
Three criteria were required in order to issue an executive-level alert. First, a microburst icon must exist 
on the projected instantaneous trajectory of the aircraft (defined by the centerline of the track-up moving 
map display). Second, the range from the aircraft to the icon must be less than 2.8 km (1.5 nautical miles) 
and, third, the icon F-factor estimate must be at least 0.105. This strategy maintains a quiet cockpit unless 
a microburst poses an actual threat to the aircraft, and is consistent with the candidate crew procedure 
described in (ref. 10). The microburst information is always presented to the pilot but no alerts are 
generated unless the pilot ignores the information and proceeds toward the event, or the event materializes 
at close range to the airplane. Note that in a classical microburst wind field the strongest wind gradient and 
F-factor exists in the core of the event, where the winds are weakest, while very weak wind gradients and 
F-factors exist in the vicinity of peak wind outflow. Since the TDWR-produced microburst shapes tend to 
enclose the peak-to-peak wind field, it is logical to assume that the shapes will overestimate the region of 
strong shear. Since insufficient data was available to determine which region within an icon contained the 
strongest shear, an alert was generated when any part of an icon intersected the projected flight path. The 
alert threshold is consistent with thresholds specified in FAA TSO-C1 17 (ref. 11) for the certification of 
reactive windshear devices and with the alert threshold for the onboard NASA in situ algorithm. 
Procedure 
The flight tests were conducted as a combined-sensor evaluation, during which the TDWR, an airborne 
doppler radar, and an airborne infrared sensor were tested. An airborne in situ detection algorithm 
developed by NASA (ref. 7) was used as a measurement standard to validate windshear predictions made 
with the various remote sensors. Since the nature of the experiment required microburst penetrations, a 
flight test technique was developed that ensured aircraft safety yet permitted meaningful measurements to 
be taken. The flight test procedure is presented in detail in reference 6 and aspects relevant to the TDWR 
experiment are summarized here. 
To ensure that adequate aircraft energy reserves (altitude and airspeed) were maintained throughout each 
microburst penetration, limits were established for microburst strength and for entry energy conditions. 
The maximum microburst F-factor, as computed from the TDWR data, that could be intentionally 
penetrated was 0.15. The minimum aircraft energy at entry was set at 228.7 meters (750 feet) altitude 
AOL and 108 m/s (210 knots) airspeed or ground speed (whichever was lowest). Higher energy conditions 
could be flown at the discretion of the pilots, and initial microburst penetrations were typically flown at 
305 to 366 meters (1000 to 1200 feet) AGL and about 118 m/s (230 knots). These limits provided a large 
energy margin for microburst penetrations. The aircraft was flown from the research flight deck during 
setup for microburst penetrations, due in part to the real-time map displays of TDWR-transmitted 
microburst location and waypoints, and the actual microburst penetrations were flown from the standard 
aircraft cockpit, due to the potential need for full control authority. Microburst penetrations were always 
flown in a clean (gear and flaps retracted) configuration. 
Since the computed F-factor of an icon is a function of aircraft speed, and tends to increase with higher 
speeds, the potential existed that adding extra airspeed before a penetration may cause the computed 
F-factor to exceed limits. This produces the counter-intuitive situation of prohibiting a penetration at one 
speed and permitting a penetration at a lower speed. The higher speed is actually less hazardous since the 
F-factor increases approximately linearly with speed while aircraft kinetic energy increases with the square 
of speed, hence providing both a higher hazard index and a higher energy margin. To avoid missing 
acceptable penetration attempts, two TDWR displays were implemented on the TSRV research flight deck. 
The display used for flight safety decisions displayed computed F-factors that were based on a fixed 
assumed speed of 108 m/s (210 knots). The second TDWR display, video taped for research purposes, 
used actual aircraft speed for F-factor calculation. All TDWR and in situ F-factor values given in this 
paper are based on actual aircraft speed values.
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For post-flight comparison of winds measured by the various sensors to the TDWR measured winds, every 
attempt was made to penetrate microbursts on TDWR radials either towards or away from the TDWR site. 
This was accomplished by defining the TDWR site as a navigation fix on the research flight deck moving 
map display and defining a radial from that fix through the TDWR icon being approached. This permitted 
precise and stable paths to be flown along the TDWR line of sight, provided other constraints such as air 
traffic, populated areas, or obstructions did not conflict with the desired path. 
Data available from the flight tests include aircraft in situ measurements of aircraft state variables, wind 
components, and F-factor; logs of all data link messages transmitted to the aircraft; and video tapes of the 
research TDWR moving map display. Additionally, range/azimuth plots of TDWR radar reflectivity, 
doppler wind, and shear were provided to NASA by MIT Lincoln Laboratory. The TDWR plots portray 
aircraft flight path as determined by a TDWR interface to the air traffic control system, which provided 
radar beacon position of the airplane. The onboard NASA in situ algorithm was used as the measurement 
standard for evaluation of each windshear sensor. The in situ F was subjected to gust rejection filters as 
described in reference 7, and therefore does not resolve very short duration gusts or shears. The filter was 
designed in accordance with the nuisance alert and time-to-detect requirements of TSO-C 117 and is 
approximately equivalent to a one-kilometer F-factor average at the speeds used in these flight tests. This 
filtering is required so that the output of the algorithm reflects windshear scales of motion that affect 
aircraft performance and reject scales of motion that would be perceived as turbulence. 
Results 
The simple data link hardware proved very reliable at both deployment locations, both while on the ground 
preparing for takeoff as well as while flying at low altitude 30 to 40 kilometers from the antenna site. The 
situation display combined with voice information from the TDWR proved invaluable for 15 to 30 minute 
projections of the weather situation, positioning the aircraft to intercept microbursts that were being 
predicted but had not yet developed, maneuvering with respect to active microbursts, and subsequent data 
analysis. 
During the two week deployment at Orlando the NASA aircraft penetrated 19 weather events that were 
generating TDWR icons at the time of penetration. Numerous other events were also encountered such as 
gust fronts, rain shafts, and divergent flows that had not yet strengthened to the point of generating an icon 
or decaying microbursts that were no longer producing icons. These other events are not included in this 
analysis. During a three week deployment at Denver the only observed microbursts were either above 
flight safety reflectivity limits or could not be reached. Hence all data presented here is from the 19 icon 
penetrations in the Orlando area. 
The data was analyzed from two perspectives. The first perspective was the overall alerting performance 
of the total TDWR system (TDWR, airborne processing, and alerting criteria) during the flight tests. Of 
particular interest was the identification of those factors affecting the accuracy of the hazard prediction. 
The second analysis perspective was the effect of each of the factors influencing performance. One of 
those factors, by necessity, is the performance of the F-factor estimation algorithm. 
Overall Performance: 
Table I summarizes the icon events encountered, icon and in situ F-factors, and whether alerts were given. 
Flight data is cataloged by event number here and later in this report. The date and universal coordinated 
time (UTC) of microburst icon entry is listed. Local time can be determined by subtracting four hours 
from UTC time. The TDWR F-factors given are the calculated values of the icon penetrated, taken at two 
times. The first value is from the most recently received data, in the aircraft flight display computers, at 
the time of entry into the icon. This value reflects the data shown on the moving map display at the time of 
entry and would be used for generating advanced warning of a microburst. The second value is from the 
next 1'DWR measurement, which more closely represents the state of the microburst while the aircraft was 
inside the core. The latter time data was generally measured by the TDWR while the airplane was inside
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the microburst and received onboard the airplane while still in the microburst icon or shortly after exit. For 
example, in event 142 the aircraft entered an icon with a computed F-factor of 0.09. The radar data used 
for this computation was nearly a minute old, and while the aircraft was still in the icon a new data link 
message, containing more recently measured radar data, was received. This data produced a computed 
F-factor of 0.13 and generated an alert, as listed in the table. The temporal effects of the TDWR data link 
will be discussed in more detail below. In most microburst encounters, the TDWR system produced 
several small icons rather than one large icon to describe the region of shear. The TDWR icon F-factor 
listed describes the icon actually penetrated and not necessarily the strongest icon of the group. The in situ 
F-factor is the maximum value recorded during the microburst penetration. Table 2 shows the TDWR 
intensity data provided to the aircraft and the aircraft state variable required to calculate F-factor. This 
data is shown for both times listed in table 1. Also shown in table 2 is the data required for altitude 
correction of the icon data, which will be discussed below. 
As this data shows, of the 19 icon penetrations, the airborne alerting algorithm and logic provided 18 alerts, 
only two of which were substantiated by an in situ alert. Figure 5 plots the peak in situ F-factor against the 
TDWR icon F-factor for 18 of the 19 events (one of the microbursts was not producing an icon at the latter 
time of table 1). The F-factor shown is the value from the TDWR data measurement taken at the latter 
time in tables 1 and 2, to most accurately compare in Situ data to TDWR data. The data shows a strong 
tendency for the TDWR icon to over estimate the hazard experienced by the airplane. This performance is 
clearly not adequate for a system that provides executive level alerts. Further analysis is required of the 
factors affecting alerting performance. The primary factors affecting the performance were identified as 1) 
spatial offset between aircraft path and strongest windshear, 2) temporal effects from the one-minute 
update rate and processing and transmission delays, 3) the use of the F-factor estimation algorithm to 
estimate hazard from global AU and AR measurements, and 4) altitude differences between the TDWR 
measurement and the microburst penetration altitude of the aircraft. 
Spatial Effect: 
The most predominant effect was the spatial offset between flight path and hazard. As previously 
described, each microburst icon enclosed the entire set and length of divergence segments detected. By 
definition, the windshear should be very low in the vicinity of peak winds and some portion of the icons 
should contain little or no shear. The TDWR data available for transmission did not isolate the region of 
the icon that contained the shear. It is therefore possible to penetrate an icon and not encounter the full 
shear described by the AU and AR values. To evaluate this effect, the events were examined to determine 
which subset involved aircraft penetrations in or very near the microburst core. 
The subset selection was done with the TDWR range/azimuth plots provided by MIT Lincoln Laboratory. 
The plots from the TDWR radar scans closest to the time of core penetration were used. The plots of 
doppler wind and shear, with aircraft track superimposed, were examined for each icon penetration. To 
qualify as a microburst core encounter, the plots had to show I) that the outflow was "well defined" and 2) 
that the aircraft track passed in or near what could be considered the center of the outflow. "Well defined" 
required that the outflow take on the appearance of a microburst, rather than poorly defined decaying 
macrobursts (storm outflows greater than 4 km in diameter) or ragged lines of divergence. Although this 
selection was by necessity subjective, in many cases the plots clearly showed that the airplane flew through 
regions of very little shear while an area of strong shear, described by the TDWR information on the data 
link, was only one or two kilometers to the side. In other cases the flight path can be clearly seen passing 
through the strongest region of a well defined event. Figure 6 depicts a microburst core miss and figure 7 
depicts a microburst core hit. Of the 19 microburst icons penetrated, only 5 (events 81, 134, 142, 143, and 
144) were determined to result in microburst core penetrations. The data for those live core penetrations 
are outlined in tables I and 2, and figure 8 shows a plot of TDWR F-factor and in situ F for those events. 
Also shown on this plot are altitude-corrected TDWR icon values, which will be discussed later. Although 
insufficient data exists for statistical significance of the results, eliminating spatial offsets appears to 
dramatically improve the agreement between radar and in situ measurements. The average of the absolute 
values of the errors between the TDWR F and the in situ F was found to be 0.03 for these five events. For 
the entire data set of 19 events, this error value increases to 0.06. 
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Temporal Effect: 
The combination of delays in data transmission and microburst growth and decay created temporal effects 
in the data set. Numerous delays were involved in providing microburst measurement data to the aircraft 
systems. The time listed for each TDWR scan is the time of the beginning of the antenna azimuth sweep, 
which requires 9 seconds to complete. The TDWR must then process the radar data to remove clutter 
returns, derive velocity, identify divergence segments, and derive microburst icons. This process requires 7 
to 10 seconds. Additional delay is generated in the process of sending the required data over phone lines to 
the data link ground station. In the event that a waypoint type message was being transmitted by the 
TDWR operator, a microburst message may have to wait for transmission. The data link transmission itself 
will normally require on the order of one second, but any failure to complete an accurate transmission will 
require a repeat of the message. Temporary data link outages were observed as the aircraft maneuvered 
and the antenna was blocked in turns. This was typically not a problem during microburst penetrations, 
however, since the last three to five miles of the microburst approach was flown as straight as feasible. 
Finally, once onboard the aircraft, another short delay was incurred in sending the information to the 
display computer and drawing the new icons. From beginning of antenna sweep to display in the aircraft, 
the delay could easily reach 20 to 30 seconds. This delay combined with the TDWR basic update rate of 
once each minute could result in displayed information being up to 1.5 minutes old. Table 1 shows the age 
of the displayed data at the time of airplane icon entry for each event. The minimum age was 25 seconds 
and the oldest was 92 seconds, with an average age of 59 seconds. 
In most of the events, these delays introduced little change in the icon F-factor. Table I shows that in three 
cases no F-factor change occurred between the two TDWR measurements and in five other cases the 
change magnitude was only 0.01. The average change magnitude was 0.02 for all events. Several events 
have considerable change in the two F-factors. Two cases produced changes of 0.03 F, two more produced 
changes of 0.04 F, and the largest change of any of the icons encountered was 0.07 F (almost 70 percent of 
the alert threshold). This change was not due to microburst strength changes, but rather to drift of the 
microburst between updates. The airplane initially entered a 0.19 F-factor icon with a weaker, 0.11 F, icon 
to one side. When the next TDWR update was received, while the aircraft was still in the microburst, the 
icons had drifted to the side and the airplane was now in a 0.12 F-factor icon. In another case (event 149 at 
21:26:30 on June 20) an icon F-factor increased from 0.18 to 0.26 in one update as the aircraft was 
approaching for a penetration. A hard turn was made to avoid that event, which is otherwise not included 
in this analysis due to the lack of actual icon entry and absence of in Situ data. In another case (event 115) 
the icons disappeared altogether in the TDWR measurement taken while the aircraft was inside the 
microburst icon. The alert generated in this event was not due to the primary icon listed (F=0.10), but a 
second, stronger, icon that the extended flight path just touched. Although changes in aircraft speed and 
altitude affect the computed F-factor, stable approaches to the microbursts were flown and had little 
influence on the F-factor computed between these two updates. For example, in the two cases where F 
changed 0.04 between updates, speed changes were on the order of 1 to 3 m/s. The change in F remained 
0.04 when the F-factor calculations were repeated using constant speeds. 
This data latency had an effect on the timing of alerts received. In three events, 86, 127, and 142, the 
computed icon F-factor was below the alert threshold at the time of icon entry, but exceeded the threshold 
and generated an alert when new data was received while still inside the icon. In one of these cases, event 
86, the change in F between the two updates was only 0.01. Although all of these alerts are classified as 
nuisance, the in situ alert was never generated in these events, the potential exists for a valid alert to be 
given only after the aircraft has encountered the microburst. 
F-factor Estimation Algorithm Effect: 
The third factor to be examined is the performance of the F-factor estimation algorithm. For this analysis, 
only those five events that produced microburst core penetrations are applicable. The F-factor estimation 
is global to the microburst, and can only be expected to apply in an encounter with the strongest area. A 
primary limitation of the estimation algorithm is that it uses an assumed wind profile (ref. 9), fit to the 
TDWR uplink parameters, to estimate the windshear in the center of the microburst. The TDWR can 
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measure the radial wind component at each radar range bin and isolate regions of strong shear, but that 
information is not readily available as an output of the system and was not available for data link. The 
information that is available describes the peak outflow winds, where the shear and hazard is lowest. 
Therefore, the Oseguera-Bowles wind profile was used to reconstruct the shear within the core of the event, 
where the shear and hazard is most intense. As shown by table 1 and figure 8 , in general the TDWR 
F-factor agreed well with the in situ F in the core penetrations. In one event, 143, the TDWR F 
significantly underestimates the in situ F encountered. Figure 9 depicts, for each microburst penetration, 
the along-track component of the winds, as measured by the aircraft air data inertial reference system 
(ADIRS), and the wind profile predicted by the F-factor estimation algorithm. To produce figure 9, the 
TDWR AU data was used to establish the wind change magnitude and the TDWR AR value was converted 
to a time interval using the airplane average ground speed during the encounter. Since the in situ wind 
profile is biased by ambient winds, the predicted wind profile has also been biased by a constant in each 
plot to better compare the slopes of the two profiles. The Oseguera-Bowles wind profile does not decay as 
rapidly outside of the microburst as quickly as the actual winds do, but only that portion between the wind 
peaks is used for F-factor prediction. 
In two events, 142 and 144, the in situ winds matched closely the model predicted wind. In the other 
events, either the TDWR wind change magnitude overestimated the in situ winds, or the scale length does 
not match well. Events 134 and 143 do not have the type of profile between the wind peaks that is 
expected by the algorithm. In event 134, the rate of wind change decreases greatly in the last half of the 
encounter and the scale length experienced was greater than predicted. This contributed to an over 
estimate of the icon F-factor. Event 143 was the only one of the five where the icon F-factor 
underestimated the in situ F. The wind profile within event 143 shows a large peak in the outflow in the 
first half of the penetration. This peak is nearly as large as the final outflow peak, which drove the TDWR 
estimate of AR. This type of wind profile may be encountered when microbursts pulse, or produce a 
secondary microburst surge within the expanding macroburst outflow of the initial pulse (ref. 12). In this 
case the TDWR may characterize the event by the larger macroburst outflow and a stronger than expected 
shear may be encountered by an aircraft. The TDWR system contains the information needed to resolve 
imbedded regions of high shear, but this information is lost in the process of characterizing an icon with a 
single AU and AR number. Figure 10 shows the TDWR shear plot for this encounter, as produced by MIT 
Lincoln Laboratory. This plot accurately locates the strong shear region in the southern side of the 
microburst first encountered by the airplane. The data shows that some error is inherent in estimating 
microburst shear from global measurements of the outflow size and strength. 
Altitude Effect: 
The final major factor influencing system performance was the difference in altitude between the TDWR 
measurement and the airplane altitude. Relatively constant F-factor with variations in altitude was used as 
an assumption in the TDWR F-factor implementation. As will be shown, this may be a reasonable 
assumption at normal takeoff and landing speeds but was not true for the research flight profiles. Although 
aircraft speed was used in the F-factor algorithm, the altitude of the aircraft was not included in any way. 
The wind change measured by the radar was used directly and the altitude of the radar beam in the 
microburst was used in the estimation of the vertical wind. In effect, the F-factor algorithm was assuming 
a penetration at the radar beam altitude. The TDWR scan elevation used for icon processing was typically 
0.3 degrees above the horizon, with some scans being taken at 0.5 degrees. The altitude of the 
measurement varied with range from the radar site, and was typically about 200 meters in the five 
significant microburst penetrations. The airplane altitude during the encounters was about 300 to 400 
meters. 
The NASA analytical microburst models described in references 9 and 13 include a shaping function which 
describes the change in microburst outflow with altitude. Figure 11 depicts the function. At high altitude a 
microburst is predominantly a downdraft. As the wind approaches the ground the outflow speed becomes 
greater until surface friction effects begin to lower the outflow speed. The shaping function is based on 
mass continuity, boundary layer friction, and wind profiles produced by the Terminal Area Simulation 
System (TASS) numerical microburst model, which has been extensively validated against observed 
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microburst data (references 14 and 15). The shaping function p(h) provides the ratio of outflow speed to 
maximum outflow speed at any arbitrary altitude. Given this shaping function, the shear estimate (0) at 
any altitude can be expressed as the shear at the altitude of maximum outflow multiplied by p(h). The 
shaping function is: 
p(h) =	 - 
0.7386
	 (7) 
where H is the altitude of maximum outflow speed. The shear estimate at an arbitrary altitude is described 
by: 
f3= fYp(h)
	 (8) 
where 3' is the shear at the altitude of maximum outflow. We can express F at any altitude as: 
F1 ='p(hJ3-+-'	 (9) 
1 g v) 
and
Vg 
F2 =
	
	 ( 10) 
g v) 
or by rearranging 9 and 10: 
Vg h 
p(h2)I(--+
F=F	
g v) 
2	 1	 (11)
Vg +24 
p(h1) g
	
v) 
Equation 11 was used as an altitude correction algorithm where F 1 is the uncorrected TDWR F-factor 
estimation, h 1 is the TDWR radar beam altitude, and h 2 is the airplane altitude. F2 then becomes the 
F-factor estimate at the airplane altitude. The altitude of maximum outflow, H, was assumed to be 90 
meters. Table 2 summarizes the original F and altitude-corrected F for each icon penetration. Also shown 
is the wind change reported by the TDWR and an altitude corrected value, used in figure 12 to compare the 
in situ along-track wind profiles to the predicted wind at flight altitude. Figure 8 shows the 
altitude-corrected icon F-factors and the peak in situ F-factors, along with the original icon F values. In 
each case, the altitude correction reduced the icon F-factor estimate. Examination of figures 8, 9, and 12 
shows that the altitude correction generally improved the wind profile fit to the actual winds experienced, 
in terms of the slope between the wind peaks. The most notable exception is event 143, where the shear 
estimation error caused by the localized shear within the larger shear is exaggerated by the altitude 
correction. This effect is only coincidental, and had the aircraft been flying well below the radar beam 
altitude, the altitude correction may have increased the F-factor estimate and masked the wind profile 
effect. Application of altitude correction to the data reduced the average of the absolute values of the 
F-factor estimation errors to 0.04 for full set of icon penetrations, and to 0.02 for the five core penetration 
events. 
The altitude correction just described was more significant to the data collected in the NASA flight tests 
than it would likely be in operational use. As the altitude of microburst penetration increases above the 
altitude of maximum outflow, the horizontal wind change decreases while the downdraft increases. Since 
the F-factor experienced by the airplane is proportional to horizontal wind gradient multiplied by ground 
speed and downdraft divided by airspeed, the horizontal component of F-factor tends to decrease with 
increasing altitude while the vertical component tends to increase with altitude. The relative magnitude of 
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these two changes depends-on airplane speed. At normal approach speeds the change in the two 
components tend to be of similar magnitude. The result is that the F-factor does not vary greatly with 
altitude above the altitude of maximum outflow up to altitudes where microbursts no longer pose a safety 
threat (about 300 to 350 meters). At the high speeds used in the microburst flights, however, the total 
F-factor is more sensitive to the horizontal wind gradient than the downdraft, and the measured F-factor 
decreases more quickly with increased altitude. Table 3 shows the altitude-corrected output of the TDWR 
F-factor algorithm for an aircraft flying at 67, 82, and 118 m/s (130, 160, and 230 knots) at altitudes of 50, 
100, 200, and 300 meters, for an assumed microburst with a AU of 25 m/s and AR of 3000 meters. The 
three speeds approximate normal approach speeds and the NASA microburst penetration speed. The 
calculations assume that the altitude of maximum outflow is 90 meters and that the radar measurement is 
taken at that altitude. At 67 and 82 m/s, the change in F-factor from 100 meters to 300 meters is only 
about 0.01, while at 118 m/s the change is nearly 0.04. Below the altitude of maximum microbursi outflow 
both horizontal winds and vertical winds decrease, leading to reduced F-factor. Some form of altitude 
correction may be required even at normal approach speeds, since variations in distance between the 
microburst and the TDWR site may cause the radar measurement to be taken well above or below the peak 
outflow altitude of the microburst. 
TABLE 3 - Effect of Aircraft Speed on Altitude Compensation of TDWR Icon F-factor 
Airspeed and Ground Speed (m/s) 
Aircraft Altitude (m)
	 67	 82	 118 
50 0.106 0.122 0.164 
100 0.137 0.151 0.192 
200 0.149 0.154 0.179 
300 0.144 0.143 0.156
Conclusion 
This experiment demonstrated the practicality of transmitting ground-based windshear information to an 
aircraft via data link, processing that information on the aircraft to estimate the windshear hazard index 
(F-factor), then providing the information on an electronic map display for operational use. Other than 
extraction of the required products, no changes were made to the TDWR system for this capability, and 
low data rate communications were adequate. In the very limited number of microburst core penetrations 
made in the 1991 flight tests, the estimated F-factor compared very favorably to the peak in situ F-factor. 
The average absolute error between the TDWR prediction and the in situ F, with temporal, spatial, and 
altitude effects minimized, was 0.02 F. Considering that the two measurements are taken from different 
locations, at different times, and with different spatial resolution, this agreement is excellent. 
When all effects are included, the performance of the prediction deteriorates significantly. The division of 
a microburst into multiple icons, and the size of the TDWR icons relative to the area of significant shear, 
contributed to the aircraft track missing the desired microburst region in 14 of 19 icon penetrations. This 
effect can create hazard estimation errors on the order of 100% of the alert threshold. Microburst growth 
and decay between the TDWR measurement updates were typically on the order of 20% of the alert 
threshold, with some updates producing changes of 40% of threshold. The error magnitude possible with 
these short latency times suggests that the timeliness of ATC verbal transmission to aircraft may be 
marginal in some situations. The update delay combined with a 30 second interval for transmission and 
display of the data on the aircraft could lead to late alerts and aircraft encounters with hazardous shears. 
The altitude effect observed in these encounters produced estimation errors on the order of 10 to 20% of 
the alert threshold. Implementation of a real-time altitude correction algorithm can easily be done on the 
aircraft., and was performed for additional microburst research flights in the summer of 1992. 
Although the TDWR and data link system, as tested, provided high-confidence advisory information and 
excellent situational awareness, an excessive number of nuisance alerts would prevent the system from 
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being used to drive executive level cockpit alerting. These nuisance alerts were primarily due to the spatial 
effect of the aircraft missing the shear region altogether, and not to any inability to measure the shear from 
the ground. The information required to minimize this limitation is resident within the TDWR system, but 
not planned as an output product of production TDWR systems. More complete use of the ground system 
capabilities, by implementing shear-based detection algorithms and icon shapes, may greatly improve the 
utility of the TDWR microburst information to the end users. 
More microbursi penetrations with TDWR coverage are required to increase confidence in the results and 
show statistical significance. Research flights were conducted in 1992 at both Denver and Orlando, during 
which numerous microburst penetrations were made. The analysis of the 1992 data will be the subject of a 
future research report. 
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Figure 9a - Along-Track Wind Profiles 
for Event 81 
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Figure 9b - Along-Track Wind Profiles 
for Event 134 
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Figure 9c - Along-Track Wind Profiles 
for Event 142 
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Figure 9d - Along-Track Wind Profiles 
for Event 143 
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Figure 9e - Along-Track Wind Profiles 
for Event 144 
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Figure 11 - Microburst Outflow Profile 
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Figure 12a - Along-Track Wind Profiles 
for Event 81, Altitude Corrected 
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Figure 12b - Along-Track Wind Profiles 
for Event 134, Altitude Corrected 
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Figure 12c - Along-Track Wind Profiles 
for Event 142, Altitude Corrected 
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Figure 12d - Along-Track Wind Profiles 
for Event 143, Altitude Corrected 
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